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Abstract
This paper develops an institutional explanation based on strategic, heterogeneous committee members for
the phenomenon of inertia in monetary policy rates, by exploring variations of a game-theoretic two-period,
two-player bargaining model with an endogenous status quo. The results show that inertial policy-making can
arise from heterogeneity in preferences and that gridlock and policy inefficiency can become more likely due
to variability in agenda-setting power, or decreases in uncertainty over the future. These conclusions are
shown to accord with the empirical evidence on monetary policy setting by committees at major central banks
over the last decade.
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1 Introduction
In the academic literature and the popular press it is oftentimes noted that central
banks are at times slow to adjust their policy rates to changes in the economic envi-
ronment (Gerlach-Kristen, 2005). Moreover, some argue that there is a tendency for
any changes in the policy variable to be only gradual when they eventually happen
(Bernanke, 2004). At the same time, some of the most inﬂuential central banks diﬀer
notably in their responsiveness. For instance, with regard to the European Central
Bank (ECB), The Economist (2005) once argued that, during the preceding years,
”it has changed interest rates less often than the Fed has, giving the impression of
paralysis”. In Figure 1, we can see a plot of the time series of the main policy rates of
the Bank of England (BoE), the ECB, and the Federal Reserve of the United States.
It shows clearly, that the policy rates over the last decade sometimes remained con-
stant for many months, even though the economic fundamentals underlying the policy
decisions are unlikely to be static.
Figure 1: Main policy rates at the Bank of England, European Central Bank and
Federal Reserve; Data Source: Central bank websites
One explanation for this policy inertia that is often emphasized in the media nar-
rative of monetary policy-making but has so far only received sparse attention in
theoretical models of monetary policy committees (MPC) is the potential conﬂict
between ”hawks” and ”doves” on a committee - members who prefer systematically
tighter or looser monetary policy respectively. The prominence of such a conﬂict has
received considerable media attention in the example of the Federal Open Market
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Committee (FOMC) that sets US interest rates (The Economist, 2008) and is con-
sidered obvious enough to be cited in the academic literature (Blinder, 2004, 2007)
without further proof. Moreover, if committee decisions are made by consensus and
the status quo policy is endogenous, diﬀerent periods will be strategically linked.
In this paper, I will build on this potential for diﬀerences in preferences within a
committee, to look for an explanation for the observed inertia in monetary policy-
making. To this purpose, I will develop a game-theoretic bargaining model of MPC
decision-making which incorporates the strategic considerations of members with sys-
tematically diﬀerent policy preferences and an endogenous status quo. Moreover, I
will explore how the eﬃciency of the strategic bargaining outcomes varies with changes
in the economic environment and the institutional setup of the committee.
Although policy decisions with an endogenous status quo are relevant in many
areas, for instance in budgetary approval proceedings, I will here focus on the appli-
cation to monetary policy. Among the reasons for this choice of application is, ﬁrstly,
the aforementioned media attention that has made committee deliberations in the
monetary policy arena much more public than those of many other political commit-
tees. Secondly, monetary policy-makers played a particularly crucial role during the
ﬁnancial crisis and understanding their behavior therefore seems most likely to aid in
preventing future crises.
Given that the majority of central banks around the world conduct monetary policy
by committee, the question whether this arrangement is beneﬁcial is an important
one - with the answer not necessarily being obvious. While there are good reasons
like democratic accountability or improved information pooling and processing for
choosing a group over an individual decision-maker(Blinder, 2004, 2009; Gerlach-
Kristen, 2006), there are also sociological (Sibert, 2006) and political issues (see for
example Waller (1992)) that need to be accounted for.
There are speciﬁc characteristics of MPCs which would aﬀect the applicability of
any theoretical argument that can be made about them: one important institutional
dimension by which central banks can be classiﬁed is whether their decisions are made
in a collegial or an individualistic manner (Blinder, 2007). In a collegial committee,
a group decision has to be reached together and a front of unity is usually presented
to the outside world. In individualistic central banks, on the other hand, individual
judgments are merely aggregated by a decision rule and accountability remains with
the members themselves. In this paper, we will only be concerned with the collegial
case, as it creates substantial room for strategic maneuvering during the decision-
making process. That is, when public dissent has to be kept to a minimum, this
puts substantial pressure on the agenda-setter to propose a policy setting that will be
accepted by the other committee members. Conversely, the latter have the opportu-
nity to weigh any oﬀer based on how it will aﬀect their bargaining position in future
periods.
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This internal mechanism of monetary policy committees becomes an important
feature of the model explored in this paper: The dynamic link between bargaining
episodes via the endogenous status quo makes the dynamic results substantially dif-
ferent from a bargaining situation with an exogenous status quo. As the bargaining
outcome in the present will remain in place unless it is renegotiated in the next period,
the players will try to anticipate, and improve the outcome of, the strategic proposals
they expect to be made in future periods. Risk-averse strategic players are therefore
willing to sacriﬁce some current utility in order to secure a more advantageous policy
status quo from which to bargain over the response to future shocks. This hedging
behavior is what leads to dynamic ineﬃciency via gridlock in my model.
Inertia is shown to result from the strategic bargaining both in the form of ”too
late” and ”too little”: Substantial gridlock, as well as pareto-ineﬃcient policy out-
comes are possible. Moreover, I ﬁnd that, rather than leading to paralysis, an increase
in uncertainty in the economic environment can actually improve the bargaining out-
comes, whereas allocating the agenda-setting power more evenly among committee
factions can exacerbate the ineﬃciencies.
This paper will be structured in the following way: First, I give a quick overview
over the related literature. Then, I provide some empirical observations on monetary
policy committees in order to motivate the assumptions of the basic bargaining model,
which I introduce in the section thereafter. In section 4, three variations of the
basic model with regard to economic environment and agenda-setting power will
be analyzed and solved, with proofs of all propositions subsequently provided in
section 5. Moreover, the implications of the theoretical results in terms of welfare
and eﬃciency will be discussed in section 6 and then brought to bear upon some
empirical observations in section 7, before I provide concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The rapid growth in contributions to the theory and empirics of central banking by
committee - especially during the last decade - can probably be attributed to the
increasing relevance of this kind of institutional setup for global economic policy:
Maier (2010) cites a study by Mahadeva & Sterne (2000) which shows that 79 out
of 94 sampled central banks at the time made decisions in an MPC, and - adding
relevance to the analysis in this paper - out of these 43 reached their decisions by
consensus.
In order to highlight the various lines of research that intersect in this paper, this
section will brieﬂy review the related literature on the political economy of policy-
making, on committees in general, and on dynamic bargaining.
One of the earliest contributions to the study of strategic behavior in the context of
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policy-making with an agenda-setter and a status quo as the default option is probably
Romer & Rosenthal (1978), who consider a static model with a single vote. Later
applications of the agenda-setter model to political contexts, like the seminal paper
by Baron & Ferejohn (1989), introduced dynamic thinking in the form of sequential
voting but still retained a static policy environment.
However, besides this literature focusing on agenda-setter models, there exists a
much larger number of studies that focus on committees and their decision-making
processes more broadly. These studies often take an institutional design perspective,
asking whether committees outperform individuals in policy decisions, why this would
be the case and how this result varies with diﬀerent aspects of the committee, such
as size or voting mechanism. It should also be noted here, that, outside of economics
and political science, there is also a literature on the psychological aspects of group
decisions for which Kerr & Tindale (2004) might serve as a good summary, but on
which I will not touch here further.
In terms of the institutional design debate, some of the advantages of group decision-
making can probably be summarized as providing insurance and beneﬁcial diversiﬁ-
cation against wildly inappropriate societal outcomes that might arise from the un-
representative preferences of an individual decision-maker. The source of advantage
for a committee over a single person is mainly seen in the fact that the checks and
balances of the former may lower the unpredictability of policy decisions compared
to the potentially extreme biases of an individual. That is, the committee decision
may represent a mitigating compromise between its members’ diﬀerent information,
preferences, models of the economy, forecasts or decision heuristics (Blinder, 2007).
Moreover, a group might also be more transparent in its operations or more repre-
sentative of a diverse society than an individual in its decision processes and might
therefore be preferred from a democratic theory perspective (Blinder, 2004).
Another way in which the group setting might improve outcomes is the pooling
of information. If individual policymakers are uncertain about the optimal policy,
the aggregation of their information by a committee can reduce the policy error, as
Gerlach-Kristen (2006) shows. However, how eﬀective the information pooling is in
practice, depends on various aspects of the institutional context (Gerlach-Kristen,
2005): If an information pooling model is adapted to account for the fact that in-
terest rates can usually only be changed in discrete steps of at least 25 basis points,
interest rate changes can become rare but large, hampering central bank eﬀective-
ness. Gerlach-Kristen (2005) show these eﬀects to be larger for central banks using a
consensus-based decision procedure rather than a simple majority vote. These results
are similar to the ones shown in this paper in that they link consensus decisions to
policy inertia, but they do not take into account heterogeneous preferences and strate-
gic behavior. Of course, there may be multiple sources of institutional inertia and
it is important to identify all of them: while the information-pooling results suggest
that a large part of the ineﬃciency could perhaps be removed by simply encouraging
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continuous rate-setting, addressing the strategic inertia found in this paper would
require a policy approach more cognizant of the committee’s institutional setup.
However, some scholars are more skeptical of the impact of committees. Those
who argue that groups might, in fact, underperform an individual can rely on various
sociological phenomena to back up their claims: As Sibert (2006) argues, if individual
eﬀort is required to improve the group outcome but the result is attributed to the
group as a whole, free riding on the eﬀort of the other members - social loaﬁng -
might result. At the same time, due to the structured nature of group conversations,
information can also never really be pooled simultaneously in a social situation so that
information cascades might occur - or a vicious cycle of self-reinforcing ”groupthink”
might lead to extreme outcomes.
With regard to most central banks, however, the professionalism and communica-
tion practices of MPCs may mitigate any concerns over social loaﬁng and information
cascades. In fact, there is little empirical evidence of ”groupthink” occurring in prac-
tice (Blinder, 2009). To the contrary, there seems to be some evidence of excessive
caution in central banks’ decisions (Gerdesmeier et al., 2010). More generally, the
often very formalized structure of monetary policy-making might make sociological
criticisms less applicable. For instance, a recent study by Chappell et al. (2012) failed
to ﬁnd any evidence that members of the FOMC during the 1970s changed the pol-
icy proposal they announced in dependence on the announcements of other members
during the policy go-around of their meetings. The authors concluded that either the
revelation of new information during the FOMC meetings left the attendees’ policy
preferences unchanged or that, perhaps, all relevant interactions already took place
before the policy go-around.
Unfortunately, given that central banks operate in a complex political and economic
environment, most empirical claims about the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy by
a speciﬁc committee usually suﬀer from a lack of reasonable counterfactuals and
scarce data on internal policy debates: The FOMC only publishes its (edited) meeting
transcripts ﬁve years after a meeting is held and the ECB neither publishes minutes
nor transcripts, but only holds a press conference shortly after a policy decision has
been made.
In the light of this scarcity of data, it makes sense that Blinder and Morgan (2005;
2008) turn to experimental research to investigate the question whether committees
outperform individuals in speed and optimality of their policy response. In two sepa-
rate studies they ﬁnd that groups do not need more information before a decision in
a simple interest-rate-setting game can be reached and that they produce better deci-
sions than individuals. More speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that groups are better at reaching
a common policy goal in an environment of noisy signals. Moreover, the same study
produces evidence that groups deciding by majority rule suﬀer less from inertia than
those under unanimity rule in reacting to shocks. However, the authors caution that
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their results are limited to “intellective tasks rather than judgmental tasks” 1. This
limits the applicability of their results to collegial committees in real monetary policy
settings, where committee members’ preferences are neither perfectly identical - their
judgments diﬀer - nor is it necessarily obvious what the ultimate goal of policymaking
should be.
One ﬁeld in which the assumption of economic policy-makers acting in some kind
of common interest has come under particular scrutiny is political science: For in-
stance, Van de Walle (2001) attributes the failure to implement economic adjustment
programs in Africa partly to the misguided ideological predispositions of country
leaders. Moreover, the import of preference-based disagreements also extends to the
political economy of monetary policy: As Shih (2008) argues, the inﬂationary cycles
of the Chinese economy in the last three decades can be traced back to the struggle
between a technocratic and a generalist political faction whose views on monetary
policy diﬀer systematically. Similarly, Posen (2000) casts doubt upon the notion of
central banks as benevolent optimizers of the public welfare by highlighting system-
atic policy mistakes by the Bank of Japan over the last two decades. These cases
illustrate, why it may be necessary to jettison the assumption of homogeneous pref-
erences with regard to economic policy-makers if we want to understand the reasons
for observed shortcomings in policymaking.
However, the literature that tries to address this issue using more complex theo-
retical models is still relatively small. Only recently have studies with a bargaining
perspective started addressing the issue of dynamic linkage between policy-setting
periods via an endogenous status quo: For instance, Dziuda & Loeper (2010) analyze
an inﬁnite horizon bargaining game with such linkages and ﬁnd that the policy rate
will be less than optimally responsive to shocks in the environment and that gridlock
may occur between patient players and thus conﬁrm the basic intuition behind my
results. However, to make the solution tractable, they restrict their analysis to dis-
crete policy choices and do not address agenda-setting power. Thus, their conclusions
are not directly applicable to the environment with a continuum of status quo values
and variations in proposal power that I analyze in this paper.
Montoro (2007) also analyzes dynamic bargaining over a one-dimensional policy be-
tween an agenda-setter and other committee members. However, although he presents
results showing how inertia can come about in a committee with more than two fac-
tions, he only allows the proposal power to be allocated randomly every period and
assumes decisions are made by majority vote. Thus, his model has very diﬀerent
strategic dynamics from the consensus-based approach I will employ in this paper
and does not oﬀer any conclusions with regard to variations in proposal power.
Similar to the model in this paper, Riboni & Ruge-Murcia (2008) solve a two-
period, two-person bargaining game with an endogenous status quo. However, they
1Blinder & Morgan (2005) p. 792
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model diﬀerences in preferences between the agenda-setter and the other committee
faction as variable between periods and do not oﬀer any insights regarding the eﬀect
of changes in the economic environment or proposal power. Nonetheless, they also
manage to explain interest rate smoothing and inertia - with the important limitation
that they assume transitions between states of agreement and disagreement and ﬁnd
that, in states of disagreement, there are never any policy changes made, which seems
hard to justify empirically.
In my analysis, on the other hand, the diﬀerence in policy preferences is kept con-
stant while the economy changes between states of optimal higher or lower policy
values (”booms and recessions”), and I introduce variations in the allocation of pro-
posal power. I believe that this captures an important empirical characteristic of
MPC decisions, which had been missing from previous analyses. In the next section,
I will review some of the empirical research on MPCs that motivates the theoretical
analysis in the main sections of this paper.
3 Empirical Motivation
In this section, I will provide some details about monetary policy-making at the
Federal Reserve and other central banks. The stylized facts based on these empirical
observations will serve to justify the assumptions of the bargaining model and the
subsequent discussion.
3.1 The Federal Open Market Committee
Although the theoretical results in this paper are applicable to all monetary policy
committees of a speciﬁc structure, it might be helpful for the reader to keep in mind
the basic structure underlying monetary policy in the US as one of the most prominent
examples: The FOMC of the Federal Reserve System consists of the 12 regional
Federal Reserve Bank (”Fed”) Presidents and the seven members of the Board of
Governors, including the chairman of the committee. A vote is granted to all the
Board members, the President of the New York Fed, and four of the other regional
Fed Presidents. The committee meets eight times per year and votes on changes in
the federal funds rate - the inter-bank lending rate - and other aspects of monetary
policy. However, the former is its main tool and is implemented by the New York
Fed through open-market operations of buying and selling ﬁnancial assets.
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3.2 Stylized Fact 1: Agenda Setter
As regards the internal structure which contextualizes the interest rate decision, the
FOMC has been described as an ”autocratically collegial” committee (Blinder, 2007),
where the chairman exerts a strong inﬂuence over the ﬁnal policy decision and is
expected to be on the winning side of the vote (See, for example Blinder (2009);
Meyer (2004)). Although their role in the committee proceedings is diminished in
comparison with the role of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, both the Bank of
England and the European Central Bank have a Governor and a President respectively
who play a signiﬁcant role in leading the meetings and communicating decisions to the
public. In fact, the ECB has a provision in place that, in case of a tie, the chairman’s
vote determines the outcome (Maier, 2010).
3.3 Stylized Fact 2: Heterogeneous Factions
There is considerable empirical evidence for the heterogeneity of preferences in mone-
tary policy committees. Chappell et al. (2005) ﬁnd that during the period 1966-1996,
the two major groups of FOMC members that are diﬀerentiated in its institutional
setup - the Board of Governors and the presidents of the regional Reserve Banks
- diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the occasions when they choose to dissent from the major-
ity view of the committee: The latter do so in favor of a tighter rather than looser
monetary policy while the former’s preferences are the reverse. Moreover, Krause
(1996) conﬁrms fundamental diﬀerences between the same two groups and even ﬁnds
empirical support for diﬀerences in sensitivity to the political environment in which
the FOMC operates. This heterogeneity extends to other MPCs: among the most
recent studies, Rouillard (2007), Gerlach-Kristen (2009) and Harris & Spencer (2009)
all show how interest rate preferences of external and internal members of the Bank
of England’s MPC diﬀer systematically. As the ECB does not publish minutes, it
is harder to verify the role of heterogeneity in its Governing Council. However, the
sheer diversity of economic situations among the 17 euro area countries represented
should make fundamental diﬀerence in policy preferences at least as likely as on the
single-country MPCs for which data is more plentiful.
3.4 Stylized Fact 3: Strategic Behavior
According to former Fed Governor Laurence Meyer, the open discussion before the
vote at the FOMC and the rarely exercised possibility of dissent are geared towards
achieving a consensus decision on policy. Moreover, there is a dynamic aspect to the
meetings, which he describes as a belief that the current decision always “will shape
the decision at the next meeting”(Meyer, 1998). There is also considerable evidence
of this dynamic consensus-seeking approach by the chairman under Alan Greenspan
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from 1987-2006 (See, for example, Olson (2004)) and it seems to continue with Ben
Bernanke at the helm of the FOMC ever since (Duke, 2010). In fact, given that the
political economy literature often treats the Federal Reserve as a whole as a strategic
actor (see Geraats (2002) for a partial survey), it seems only consistent to model the
factions constituting an MPC as strategically forward-looking in their decisions as
well.
3.5 Stylized Fact 4: Renegotiation and Endogenous Status
Quo
Although the fact that monetary policy can be changed at every meeting and that
the policy rate stays the same if it is not changed seems too obvious to back up with
evidence, let me note that this is an aspect in which MPCs diﬀer from the committees
considered in much of the political economy literature: once a decision has been
made, the game does not end. Monetary policy needs to be constantly adjusted
to changes in the economic environment and is therefore open to renegotiation at
every meeting. Because of the need to adapt the monetary policy rate to changes in
the economic environment - often conceptualized as changes in the ”natural rate of
interest” Woodford (2003) -, the failure to reach consensus on a new policy does not
mean that the eﬀective stance of monetary policy in that period does not change: the
failure to accommodate a change in the economic environment, by reverting to the
status quo of the policy rate instead, may be just as problematic as an active change
in the policy rate in the wrong direction. Based on these styIized facts, I will lay out
a model of consensus-based dynamic policy bargaining by two heterogeneous parties
in a committee in the following section.
4 The Basic Models
4.1 The Policy Preferences
There are two heterogeneous members of the committee: C, the chairman, and M .
These two agents bargain over a policy outcome xt, where x ∈ [0, 1], in each of two
rounds at times t = 1, 2. Their institutional role diﬀers, as the chairman is the
agenda-setter and proposes a new policy xt in every round, while M can only accept
or reject this proposal without amendments. However, in section 4.3, I will relax this
constraint to see how giving the players an even chance at being the agenda-setter
aﬀects the results. For now, however, note that when M rejects the proposal, the
policy setting at the beginning of the period - ”the status quo” - remains in place until
the beginning of the next period. Otherwise, the accepted new policy is implemented.
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The sequence of the game is the following: There are crisis periods and calm periods.
At the beginning of every crisis period t a state of the economy St is drawn
2 from
two possible values 1 and 2 with transition probabilities prob(1 | 2) = prob(2 |
1) = 1/2. This state variable determines the policy preferences ri(t) ∈ [0, 1] of the
policymakers i = C,M in that bargaining period. In the ﬁrst period only, a status quo
q1 is also exogenously given, whose value is always a point in the continuum [0, 1]
3.
Then, the chairman C proposes a policy xt to the other member and she accepts or
rejects. Based on this decision, either the new policy or the status quo is implemented,
and becomes q2, the status quo for the second period. Every policymaker i incurs
quadratic losses in every period for the distance between the implemented policy and
her preferred policy ri(t) and discounts future losses by δ ∈ [0, 1]. The quadratic
form of the loss function means that the players are risk-averse. In each period t,
they receive the following payoﬀ:
Ui(xt, t) = −(xt − ri(t))2 (1)
Consequently, the expected utility of the two-period game to member i is
E(ui(x1, x2)) = E
(
2∑
t=1
δt−1Ui(xt, t)
)
. (2)
We will consider state-dependent preferences, where a state change leads to a shift
in the same direction for both members’ preferences by the same amount. Thus,
their bias with respect to each other remains the same. That is, in state 1, we
assume rC(
1) = 0 and rM(
1) = 1/2. In state 2, both preferences shift up, so that
rC(
2) = 1/2 and rM(
2) = 1.
In a calm period, on the other hand, the economy is with certainty in an interme-
diate state 3. The bias distance between the two committee members is also 1
2
and
the preferences in the calm state are rC(
3) = 1/4 and rM(
3) = 3/4. Thus, the crisis
period preferences are a mean-preserving spread over the calm period preferences.
The chairman’s strategy in these policy bargaining games consists of choosing his
preferred proposal, which we will call GC,t(qt, 
s), among those that the other commit-
tee member will accept. Obversely, M ’s strategy consists in accepting only proposals
that he expects to make him better oﬀ than the status quo. Both strategies will
depend on the status quo, the period of the game, and the preferences derived from
the state of the economy.
2The time subscript will be dropped at times to simplify the notation, when it is otherwise clear,
which period the state variable is referring to.
3For the welfare analysis in section 6, I will have to rely on the assumption that q1 is uniformly
distributed over the policy space. However, for the analytical solution of the model this is immaterial
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4.2 The Planner’s Solution
In order to have a benchmark for comparison when I will derive the committee’s
equilibrium policy bargaining outcome, I derive the optimal solution that would be
implemented by a utility-maximizing benevolent planner in a crisis period. The prob-
lem he would be faced with is to ﬁnd a vector XS = (x1, x2) of policy outcomes for
every period that solves
max
X
[E(uC(x1, x2)) + E(uM(x1, x2))]
conditional on the states st . It is easy to see that, due to the symmetric payoﬀs,
the planner will simply choose the average of the preferred policy values of the two
members in every state. Moreover, as changing the policy is costless and no strategic
concerns are involved, he will choose the welfare-maximizing policy in every period.
That is, x∗1(
1) = x∗2(
1) = 1/4, x∗1(
2) = x∗2(
2) = 3/4 and x∗1(
3) = x∗2(
3) = 1/2.
Note that this social welfare-maximizing outcome is independent of the status quo in
either period.
4.3 Model 1: The Crisis-Calm Game
The ﬁrst two-period scenario that I will consider is that of a crisis period followed
by a calm period. The stylized story behind this scenario could be a shock to the
economy, which shifts the committee members’ policy preferences up or down in the
short run but leaves their long term preferences unaﬀected because they know that
the economic environment will be calm again quite soon. I would like to explore in
this model, how their knowledge of the imminent return to diﬀerent policy preferences
aﬀects the strategic committee members’ ability to respond to the crisis in the ﬁrst
period given the status quo. In order to solve for the subgame perfect equilibria of the
game I will use backward induction, approaching the problem as Baron & Ferejohn
(1989) do in their seminal paper on bargaining in legislatures.
4.3.1 The Calm Second Period
In the second and last period of the game, which is equivalent to the one-period
game, both the chairman, as the ﬁxed agenda-setter, and the other committee member
simply try to achieve an outcome as close as possible to their preferred policy, treating
the ﬁrst period policy x1 as the given status quo q2.
Consequently, for any q2 < 1/4, the chairman simply proposes his preferred policy
GC,2(q2, 
3) = 1/4 while gridlock occurs if the status quo falls in between the diﬀerent
preferences. To see this, note that M prefers x2 = 1/4 to all lower policies because
they would be farther away from his second-period preference rM(
3) = 3/4. For
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q2 ∈ [1/4, 3/4], however, whileM still prefers higher policy rates, C only beneﬁts from
policy outcomes lower than the q2: consequently, the acceptance set only contains the
status quo.
For q2 > 3/4 however, both C and M would like the policy to be lower. Thus,
C’s agenda setter power allows him to propose and get accepted any policy which is
at least as close to rM(
3) = 3/4 as the status quo. In equilibrium, C thus proposes
GC,2(q2, 
3) = 3
2
− q2 for these high status quo values, which is simply the reﬂection
of q2 in rM . These equilibrium bargaining outcomes in the last period are shown in
Figure 2. The graph shows the equilibrium policy outcome in that period for every
possible value of the status quo.
Figure 2: period 2, state 3
4.3.2 The First Period
As we have seen above, the second period strategies map every status quo q2 to one,
and only one, proposal GC,2(q2, 
3) that maximizes C’s payoﬀ given M ’s acceptance
set. As we are looking for subgame perfect equilibria for the game, both players
will make their ﬁrst-period decisions in expectation of the second-period equilibrium
outcomes GC,2(q2, 
3).
Because q2 = x1, we can reduce the chairman’s problem in t = 1 to choosing the
optimal GC,1(q1, 
s) by solving
GC,1(q1, 
s) = arg max
x∈A1(q1,s)
UC,1(x1, 
s) + δUC,2(x1, 
3) (3)
for s = 1, 2. Here, A1(q1, 
s) denotesM ’s acceptance set. More speciﬁcally, M accepts
any policy proposal only under the condition
A1(q1, 
s) = x1 ∈ [0, 1] s.t. UM,1(x1, s) + δUM,2(x1, s) ≥ UM,1(q1, s) + δUM,2(q1, s)
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with s = 1, 2.
In words, the chairman chooses his ﬁrst-period proposal such that it will be accepted
and optimal given what he knows about the feasible second-period policies that result
from it. The other committee member M , on the other hand, will only accept ﬁrst-
period proposals, and their later consequences, that make him no worse oﬀ than the
status quo and its second-period consequences. I will assume without loss of generality
that M accepts if he is indiﬀerent between the policy oﬀered and the status quo and
that C determines his choice of proposal by a coin ﬂip, if his strategy suggests several
policies between which he is indiﬀerent4.
The subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the two-period game consist of the
second period strategies as given above and the ﬁrst period strategies, which are
summarized in the following proposition (the proofs for all propositions are provided
in section 5):
Proposition 1 : In the two-period game with a ﬁxed agenda-setter and a calm
second period, for all q1 ∈ [0, 1] in the states 1 and 2, the chairman proposes, and
M accepts, GC,1(q1, 
1) and GC,1(q1, 
2) respectively, where
GC,1(q1, 
1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
q1 for q1 ∈
[
0,
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
]
2
(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− q1 for q1 ∈
[
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
, 2
(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− 1
4
]
1
2
− z1 for q1 ∈
[
2
(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− 1
4
, 1
]
for which z1 =
√
(1 + δ)q21 − (3δ+22 )q1 + 5δ16 + 14 , and
GC,1(q1, 
2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2 + δ
4 + 4δ
for q1 ∈
[
0,
2 + δ
4 + 4δ
]
q1 for q1 ∈
[
2 + δ
4 + 4δ
,
(
2 + δ +
√
8δ
4 + 4δ
)]
2 + 5δ
4 + 4δ
for q1 ∈
[(
2 + δ +
√
8δ
4 + 4δ
)
,
2 + 5δ
4 + 4δ
]
q1 for q1 ∈
[
2 + 5δ
4 + 4δ
,
4 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
]
2
(
4 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− q1 for q1 ∈
[
4 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
,
6 + δ
4 + 4δ
]
2 + 5δ
4 + 4δ
for q1 ∈
[
6 + δ
4 + 4δ
, 1
]
4This assumption is harmless as far as my results are concerned because the policy space is
continuous, but it allows the notation not to be cluttered with the distinction between open and
closed intervals.
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for δ ∈ [0, 1]. These results are graphed in Figure 3, for δ = 1/2 in panels A and C
and for δ = 1 in panels B and D.
Figure 3: First Period Proposals of Proposition 1: δ = 1
2
, 1(A); δ = 1, 1(B); δ =
1
2
, 2(C); δ = 1, 2(D)
Considering this proposition, there are clear diﬀerences to the results in the ”naive”
repeated games without links between the bargaining periods. On the one hand,
such one-shot bargaining outcomes (as shown in Figure 2) are all pareto-eﬃcient in
that they fall between the policy preferences of the two factions and thus neither
committee member could be made better oﬀ without making the other worse oﬀ in
the same period. This is not true in the ﬁrst period of the dynamic game: Here,
generally, a pareto-ineﬃcient ﬁrst-period policy results for 1
2
≤ q1 ≤ (2+4δ4+4δ ) in state 1
and for all 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 12 in state 2. For instance, in the case where δ = 1, in state 1
the bargaining outcome for 1/2 < q1 < 3/4 will not be pareto-eﬃcient and in 
2 this
is true for all q1 < 1/2.
Moreover, in the dynamic model, gridlock occurs for a wide range of values. In
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1, the status quo is not changed for all q1 ∈
[
0,
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
]
and in 2 for all q1 ∈[
2 + δ
4 + 4δ
,
(
2 + δ +
√
8δ
4 + 4δ
)]
.
4.4 Model 2: The Strategic Eﬀect of Uncertainty
In order to better understand the impact of uncertainty on the inertial behavior of
committees, in this section I will explore the consequences of replacing the certain
preferences in the previously ”calm” second period with the variable economic envi-
ronment another ”crisis” period. Note that the only diﬀerence to the basic model is
now that the possible preferences of each committee member in the last period are
a mean-preserving spread of their calm period value. The narrative above is easily
adapted to this scenario by imagining a profound and chaotic shift in the economic
environment which leaves open the possibility of quick recovery or a continuation of
the shock in the following period.
4.4.1 The Second Period
In order to derive the optimal decision rules for both members in the scenario with
two crisis periods, we can again use backward induction: In the second period both
members simply desire a policy outcome as close to their preference as possible,
considering ﬁrst period policy x1 as the given status quo q2. This preference now
depends on the state of nature S2 .
Thus, in state 1, for any q2 ∈ [0, 1/2], the status quo will also become the new policy
outcome. To see this, note that the status quo’s position in between the two preferred
points means that any proposal that the chairman prefers to the status quo is farther
away from M ’s optimal point than the status quo and would be rejected. Thus,
gridlock occurs for q2 < 1/2. However, for every q2 ∈ [1/2, 1], the chairman can make
a proposal GC,2(q2, 
1) = 1−q2 which is strictly smaller than the status quo policy for
all q2 > 1/2 and thus preferred by the chairman. This is the most proﬁtable outcome
to the chairman which the other member will accept. M is indiﬀerent between such
a proposal and the status quo because
UM(q2, 
1) = −(q2 − 1/2)2 = ((1− q2)− 1/2)2 = UM(GC,2(q2, 1), 1).
In state 2, on the other hand, the gridlock interval moves up together with the
preferences: Based on an argument similar to the one above, now for q2 ∈ [1/2, 1] no
change in policy can be agreed upon - the status quo remains unchanged. In case of
q2 ∈ [0, 1/2), the chairman’s preferred policy point x2 = 1/2 is also preferred by M
to the status quo. Thus, the chairman proposes GC,2(q2, 
2) = 1/2 ∀ q2 < 1/2 and M
accepts. These policy outcomes in equilibrium are summarized in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Second period equilibrium proposals: state 1(A); state 2 (B)
4.4.2 The First Period Game
As we have seen above, the second period game maps the status quo q2 to one and
only one best policy outcome attainable by C in either state. Given the chairman’s
second-period choice of policies GC,2(x1, 
s) that will actually be accepted, the choice
of x1 determines the second-period outcome as well if the players are sequentially
rational. Consequently, with both states equally likely, we can reduce the chairman’s
problem in period 1 to choosing the optimal GC,1(q1, 
s) by solving
GC,1(q1, 
s) = arg max
x∈A1(q1,s)
UC(x1, 
s) +
δ
2
(
2∑
s=1
UC,2(x1, 
s)
)
(4)
for s = 1, 2. Here, A1(q1, 
s) denotesM ’s acceptance set. More speciﬁcally, M accepts
any policy proposal only under the condition
A1(q1, 
s) = x1 ∈ [0, 1] s.t. UM(x1, s)+δ
2
(
2∑
s=1
UM,2(x1, 
s)
)
≥ UM(q1, s)+δ
2
(
2∑
s=1
UM,2(q1, 
s)
)
with s = 1, 2.
The second period strategies are the same as above and below are the optimal
strategies in the ﬁrst period - the proof can be found in the section 5.
Proposition 2 : In the two-period game with uncertainty over the second period
state of the economy s2, for all q1 ∈ [0, 1] and economic states 11 and 21, the chairman
16
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 10 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol10/iss1/4
proposes (and M accepts) GC,1(q1, 
1) and GC,1(q1, 
2) respectively, where
GC,1(q1, 
1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
q1 for q1 ∈
[
0,
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
]
2
(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− q1 for q1 ∈
[
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
, 2
(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− 1
2
]
1
2
− v for q1 ∈
[
2
(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− 1
2
, 1
]
for which v =
√
(4q1 − 2)(2q1δ2 + 6q1δ + 4q1 − 2δ2 − 5δ − 2)
2δ + 4
, and
GC,1(q1, 
2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2 + δ
for q1 ∈
[
0,
1
2 + δ
]
q1 for q1 ∈
[
1
2 + δ
,
(
1
2 + δ
)(
1 +
√
2δ3
4
√
δ + 1
)]
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
for q1 ∈
[(
1
2 + δ
)(
1 +
√
2δ3
4
√
δ + 1
)
,
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
]
q1 for q1 ∈
[
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
,
4 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
]
2
(
4 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− q1 for q1 ∈
[
4 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
, 1
]
for δ ∈ [0, 1]. These results are graphed in panels A and C, as well as B and D of
Figure 5 for δ = 1/2 and δ = 1 respectively.
This proposition shows that a mean-preserving spread over the second period pref-
erences changes the ﬁrst period dynamics of the game. While the range of status quo
values that lead to a bargaining outcome that is pareto-ineﬃcient is unchanged from
Model 1 for 1, in 2 it is reduced to
q1 <
(
1
2 + δ
)(
1 +
√
2δ3
4
√
δ + 1
)
≤ 1
2
.
Moreover, while the gridlock interval is the same in state 1 of Proposition 2 as in
Model 1, there are two gridlock intervals under uncertainty in state 2 instead of one.
Their combined size is √
2δ3
(8 + 4δ)
√
1 + δ
+
1
2 + 2δ
.
Note also, that there is a discrete and relatively large jump in the reaction function
at q1 =
(
1
2 + δ
)(
1 +
√
2δ3
4
√
δ + 1
)
≤ 1
2
to a pareto-eﬃcient bargaining outcome.
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Figure 5: First Period Proposals of Proposition 2: δ = 1
2
, 1(A); δ = 1, 1(B); δ =
1
2
, 2(C); δ = 1, 2(D)
4.5 Model 3: Taking Turns - The Eﬀect of Proposal Power
While the diﬀerence between Model 1 and Model 2 illustrated the impact of a change
in the economic environment, the ineﬃciency of the MPC might depend on its insti-
tutional setup of agenda-setting power. Therefore, I will in this section investigate
how my results are aﬀected by relaxing the monopoly on proposal power that the
chairman holds. To that end, I will introduce another draw at the beginning of ev-
ery period that determines which of the two committee factions gets to propose the
policy, leaving the other to accept or reject the proposal. Thus, the chairman no
longer is the ﬁxed agenda-setter - C and M are ex ante identical in their institu-
tional role. More speciﬁcally, the random variable λLt - the state of leadership in
the committee - has two possible values λ1 and λ2 with equal transition probabilities
prob(λ1 | λ2) = prob(λ2 | λ1) = 1/2. I take λ1 and λ2 to represent C and M holding
the proposal power respectively. Note that Model 2 is simply a special case of this
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model where the probability of λ2 occurring is zero.
4.5.1 Second Period
The second period is basically as before, but for the two possible leadership states
λL2 . Thus, there are now four diﬀerent situations that are equally likely to occur if we
consider every combination of the leadership with the two states of the economy. The
state vectors (1, λ1) and (2, λ1) are the ones already analyzed in section 4.4.1 and
graphed in Figure 4. Now we need to ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies for (1, λ2) and
(2, λ2), the second period bargaining outcomes of which are depicted in ﬁgure 6. The
basic model I am considering is symmetric in the sense that the players’ equilibrium
strategies are mirror images: if the numbering of the policy space were inverted, the
second period outcomes if M has the proposal power turn out to be symmetric to
C’s equilibrium proposals. Thus, the reasoning for M ’s second period proposals is
strictly analogous to the one employed in section 4.4.1 above.
Figure 6: Second Period equilibrium if M holds proposal power: state 1(A); state 2
(B)
4.5.2 First Period
Knowing these four possible second-period scenarios and their likelihood, the party
holding the agenda-setting power in the ﬁrst period chooses the optimal acceptable
policy GL,1(q1, 
s). For the sake of being able to compare results more easily, I will
assume that the draw has granted C the proposal power in the ﬁrst period. However,
due to the modeling symmetry, all results are easily transferable to M holding the
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proposal power ﬁrst. Thus, in the ﬁrst period C needs to solve
GC,1(q1, 
s
t , λ
L
2 ) = arg max
x∈AL1 (q1,st ,λLt )
UC(x1, 
s
1) +
δ
4
(
2∑
L=1
2∑
s=1
UC,2(x1, 
s, λL2 )
)
(5)
for s = 1, 2 and L = 1, 2. Here, AL1 (q1, 
s, λLt ) denotes the acceptance set of the faction
chosen to accept or reject the other party’s proposal - by assumption this is M . More
speciﬁcally, M accepts any policy proposal only under the condition that
A1(q1, 
s, λLt ) = x1 ∈ [0, 1] s.t.
UM(x1, 
s)+
δ
4
(
2∑
L=1
2∑
s=1
UM,2(x1, 
s, λL2 )
)
≥ UM(q1, s)+ δ
4
(
2∑
L=1
2∑
s=1
UM,2(q1, 
s, λL2 )
)
,
with s = 1, 2 and L = 1, 2.
Under these conditions, we can again derive the equilibrium proposals for any given
status quo in the ﬁrst period, given in Proposition 3, the proof of which can be found
in section 5.
Proposition 3 : In the two-period game with uncertainty over the second period
state of the economy s2 and assignment of proposal power λ
L
2 in the second period,
for all q1 ∈ [0, 1] in the states 11 and 21, the ﬁrst-period agenda-setter C proposes
(and M accepts) GC,1(q1, 
1
1) and GC,1(q1, 
2
1) respectively, where
GC,1(q1, 
1
1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
δ
8 + 6δ
for q1 ∈
[
0,
δ
8 + 6δ
]
q1 for q1 ∈
[
δ
8 + 6δ
,
2 + δ
4 + 3δ
]
2
(
2 + δ
4 + 3δ
)
− q1 for q1 ∈
[
2 + δ
4 + 3δ
, 1
2
]
z(q1, δ) for q1 ∈
[
2
(
2 + δ
4 + 3δ
)
− 1
2
, J1
]
q1 for q1 ∈
[
J1,
4 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
]
2
4 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
− q1 for q1 ∈
[
4 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
, 2
4 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
− J1
]
z(q1, δ) for q1 ∈
[
2
4 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
− J1, 1
]
for which
z =
2 + δ
4 + 3δ
− 3
8 + 6δ
√
(1/9)(2δ + 4)2 − 4(δ + 4/3)(q1(4/3 + 5δ/3)− q21(δ + 4/3)− δ/2)
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and
J1 =
15δ2 −√3(3δ2 + 4δ) + 32δ + 16
2(3δ + 4)2
.
GC,1(q1, 
2
1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
4 + δ
8 + 6δ
for q1 ∈
[
0,
4 + δ
8 + 6δ
]
q1 for q1 ∈
[
4 + δ
8 + 6δ
, J2
]
2 + 2δ
4 + 3δ
for q1 ∈
[
J2,
2 + 2δ
4 + 3δ
]
q1 for q1 ∈
[
2 + 2δ
4 + 3δ
,
8 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
]
2
(
8 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
)
− q1 for q1 ∈
[
8 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
, 1
]
where
J2 =
3δ2 +
√
3(3δ2 + 4δ) + 16δ + 16
2(3δ + 4)2
for δ ∈ [0, 1]. These results are graphed for δ = 1/2 and δ = 1 in panels A and C, as
well as B and D of Figure 7, respectively.
Under uncertainty over the future economic state and the proposal power, the
dynamics are diﬀerent from the two other models: now, as we can see in panels A
and B of Figure 6, in 1 there are several inﬂection points of the proposal function, so
that some proposals could result from up to four diﬀerent status quo policy values.
As we have removed the ex ante asymmetry in proposal power, it turns out that
this also equalizes the ineﬃciency of the two economic states: the gridlock intervals
in, 1 and 2, both add up to equal J2 respectively.
4.6 Results
In the three models solved above, we have found that substantial inertia and policy
ineﬃciency can be found in dynamic bargaining models with an endogenous status
quo. Moreover, three diﬀerent variations in the model have been analyzed and fully
solved: Firstly, the change between Model 1 and 2 illustrates the impact of uncertainty
in the form of a mean-preserving spread in second period preferences on the policy
outcome. Secondly, the institutional change from Model 2 to Model 3 shows that
equilibrium strategies and inertial behavior can change substantially in response to
a variation in agenda-setting power. The exact direction of these changes in policy
ineﬃciency will be discussed in a later section.
However, the basic intuition underlying these observations of inertial behavior in
the model, which will be important to understand the impact of the variations, is
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Figure 7: First Period proposals of Proposition 3: δ = 1
2
, 1(A); δ = 1, 1(B); δ =
1
2
, 2(C); δ = 1, 2(D)
the following: In every model analyzed above, the second-period outcomes that are
anticipated make all ﬁrst-period policy decisions a tradeoﬀ for every player between
attaining a policy close to the ﬁrst-period preference, and gaining a status quo that
will lead to more favorable outcomes in the second period. Due to the quadratic
payoﬀs, both players are risk-averse. Consequently, there are policy values at the
margin of the policy space that both players dislike. If the ﬁrst-period status quo is
in these areas, both players are willing to make concessions to move towards ”safer”
policy rates closer to the center of the range which give them a higher expected utility
in the game as a whole. However, the agenda-setter can use his proposal power to
extract most of this utility increase from the other committee member. In the graphs
in this paper, we can see this eﬀect in the kinks in the proposal curve that appear
close to the upper end of the possible status quo range and bring the equilibrium
outcome closer to the agenda-setter’s preference.
In all three models, discrete jumps in the equilibrium proposal function are possible.
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These occur because the second-period equilibrium outcome functions are multiple-
to-one functions which can lead to multiple local utility maxima in the ﬁrst period
for every player. For instance, when in the ﬁrst period one locally optimal policy rate
for proposals in the lower half of the policy continuum is unattainable due to the veto
power of the other committee member, the agenda setter might switch his proposal
to the local maximum in the upper half of the policy continuum, which appears as a
jump in the equilibrium proposal plot. Due to these jumps, marginal changes in the
ﬁrst-period status quo can, at times, lead to substantially diﬀerent policy outcomes,
which means that strategic policy committees can behave in seemingly erratic ways
that are a result of their dynamic bargaining mechanism.
Moreover, in every possible ﬁrst-period state of all three models, there are status
quo values that result in a pareto-ineﬃcient policy - a policy outcome that does not lie
in between the two players’ preferences ri(
s) for that period. These ineﬃciencies are
noteworthy because they could be improved upon from an overall welfare standpoint
by simply appointing one of the two factions as the policy-setter without giving the
other faction any input into the decision-making.
Two diﬀerent aspects of the bargaining model together induce these ineﬃciencies:
On the one hand, the consensus-seeking approach means that the other committee
member can eﬀectively veto future policy changes. On the other hand, the link
between periods via the endogenous policy status quo enables the agenda-setter to
hedge against being stuck - due to a lack of consensus - at a very unfavorable policy
rate in the future. This hedging then comes at the cost of pareto-eﬃciency in the
ﬁrst period. In some sense, the ineﬃciency occurs because the agenda-setter only
internalizes his private cost from the hedging when he weighs diﬀerent proposals,
imposing a negative externality on the overall welfare outcome.
The comparative statics of the variations on the basic model and the testable
implications that can be derived from them are discussed in more detail in section 6.
5 Proofs of Propositions
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
5.1.1 First-period state is 1
For all ﬁrst-period proposals x1 ≤ 1/4, the second-period outcome is the same: the
chairman’s preference. Moreover, C’s second-period payoﬀ falls with higher x1 for all
1/4 < x1 ≤ 1. Thus, given any status quo q1 ≤ 1/2, the chairman’s sole concern is to
bring the outcome as close as possible to his preference rC(
1) = 0 in the ﬁrst period
- only proposals smaller or equal to the status quo will be made by the chairman.
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However, as the second-period utility to M would be unaﬀected or lowered by
accepting any x1 < q1 for all q1 ≤ 1/2, while his ﬁrst-period utility actually decreases
for higher policies x1, his acceptance set only contains values at least as big as the
status quo, that is
A1(q1 ≤ 1
2
, 1) = x1 ∈ [0, 1] s.t. x1 ≥ q1.
Combining this restriction with C’s payoﬀs, we see that the GC,1(q1 ≤ 1/2, 1) = q1.
In order to deﬁne M ’s preferences for q1 > 1/2, we need to ﬁnd the ﬁrst-period
policy that maximizes his total game payoﬀ:
max
x1
−[(x1 − 1
2
)2 + δ(x2 − 3
4
)2] (6)
where the second period outcome as a function of the ﬁrst-period outcome is given
in section 4.3.1 . The unique solution is x∗1,M =
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
. As payoﬀs are symmetric
around x∗1,M , M ’s acceptance set for a certain range of status quo values will only
contain values of x1 that are at least as close as q1 to x
∗
1,M . That is, we need
A1(q1 ≥ 1
4
, 1) = x1 ∈ [1/4, 1] s.t. ‖x1 − 2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
‖ ≤ ‖q1 − 2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
‖ (7)
where the restriction to outcomes larger than 1/4 will be explained below. Again,
the chairman prefers no outcome in the acceptance set to the status quo as long as
q1 ≤ x∗1,M . Thus the gridlock with GC,1(q1, 1) = q1 is in fact the equilibrium outcome
for all status quo values 0 ≤ q1 ≤ x∗1,M .
However, for q1 > x
∗
1,M it is easy to see that M ’s utility decreases for higher status
quo values. Thus, M ’s equidistance acceptance set given in equation 7 will contain
some policies x1 < q1. These are of course preferred by C to the status quo. Thus,
the equilibrium proposal by C will be the lowest one of these, that is,
GC,1(q1, 
1) =
{
x1 s.t. ‖x1 − x∗1,M‖ = ‖q1 − x∗1,M‖
}
= 2x∗1,M − q1. (8)
for all values x∗1,M ≤ q1 ≤ (2x∗1,M − 1/4). The latter limit comes about, because
for x1 < 1/4, the maximization in equation 6 no longer accurate because the second-
period outcome function changes there - for q2 ≤ 1/4, it is simply constant at δ4 .
Thus, we need to adjust the utility function that we compare to the utility that M
obtains from the status quo accordingly. in order to ﬁnd the outcomes x1 < 1/4 in
M ’s acceptance set, which give him higher utility than the status quo, we need to
solve:
−
[
(x1 − 1
2
)2 +
δ
4
]
≥ −
[
(q1 − 1
2
)2 + δ(
3
4
− q1)2
]
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where the second-period payoﬀ on the right-hand side is a result ofGC,2(q2 > 3/4, 
3) =
3
2
− q2. This inequality condition will be binding in equilibrium, as the chairman
chooses the lowest value of this acceptance set. The only solution to the binding
constraint for which 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1/4, is deﬁned by
GC,1(q1, 
1) =
1
2
−
√
(1 + δ)q21 − (
3δ + 2
2
)q1 +
5δ
16
+
1
4
.
which will therefore be the equilibrium proposal for (2x∗1,M − 1/4) ≤ q1 ≤ 1. Note
that this proposal function declines more steeply than the one in equation 8. The
intuition behind this is that for 1/4 < x1 < 3/4, a lower ﬁrst-period policy led to
lower utility for M in the second period. For x1 < 1/4, however, the second-period
outcome is constant in this low range of ﬁrst-period policies so that lower ﬁrst-period
policies do not ”hurt” M at the margin in the second period. Thus, C can extract
larger concessions in terms of policy space in the ﬁrst period while leaving M no
worse oﬀ than staying with the status quo.
5.1.2 First-period state is 2
Here, we start by ﬁnding the optimal ﬁrst-period policy for M by solving:
max
x1
−[(x1 − 1)2 + δ(x1 − 3
4
)2]
The solution is
x∗1,M =
4 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
.
As above, this maximization accurately describes M ’s optimization problem unless
we have x1 < 1/4 as the chairman’s proposal, which is never the case in equilibrium,
as I will show below. Consequently, M ’s acceptance set is
A1(q1, 
1) = x1 ∈ [0, 1] s.t. ‖x1 − x∗1,M‖ ≤ ‖q1 − x∗1,M‖. (9)
Similarly, we can ﬁnd C’s optimal ﬁrst-period policy for low q1 by solving
max
x1
−[(x1 − 1
2
)2 + δ(x1 − 1
4
)2] ∀ x1 ∈ [1/4, 3/4]. (10)
Here, the solution is
x∗1,C =
2 + δ
4 + 4δ
.
For x1 < 1/4, the maximization in equation 10 is not valid, because the second period
payoﬀ is constant over that interval. However, we can easily see that the optimal
proposal for C with a constant second-period payoﬀ is 1/2 which lies outside of the
interval over which we are maximizing. Thus the chairman never proposes x1 < 1/4
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in equlibrium. This is possible, because some x1 > 1/4 will always be accepted as
we see below - making the maximizations in equation 10 suﬃcient t characterize the
equilibrium strategies in spite of the change in the second-period payoﬀ function for
low q1 < 1/4.
Consequently, as long as x∗1,C ≥ q1, that is, for all q1 <
2 + δ
4 + 4δ
the chairman can
propose his optimal policy in equilibrium and M accepts. However, for greater status
quo values, the chairman’s preferred policy is lower than the status quo. We know
from the deﬁnition of M ’s acceptance set in (9) above that M will reject values lower
than the status quo if both proposal and status quo are lower than x∗1,M . Thus, an
interval of gridlock begins, whose lower bound is given by q1 =
2 + δ
4 + 4δ
= x∗1,C .
In order to determine the upper bound of the gridlock interval we need to consider
the point where C’s second-period payoﬀ function changes: For all x1 > 3/4, we have
seen in section 4.3.1 that GC,2(q2, 
3) = 3
2
− x1. Again, we can calculate C’s optimal
policy - we will call it x∗∗1,C to diﬀerentiate it from x
∗
1,C - if he chooses an x1 in this
range. We solve
max
x1
−[(x1 − 1
2
)2 + δ(
3
2
− x1 − 1
4
)2] ∀ x1 ∈ [3/4, 1] (11)
and ﬁnd that
x∗∗1,C =
2 + 5δ
4 + 4δ
.
Now, in order to determine when, if ever, C prefers to propose such a high x1 to
sticking with the status quo under gridlock, we can simply look for a threshold value
qr1 after which continuing with the gridlock yields a lower payoﬀ than switching to
proposing x∗∗1,C instead. We solve for q
r
1 in
(q1 − 1
2
)2 + δ(q1 − 1
4
)2 = (x∗∗1,C −
1
2
)2 + δ(
3
2
− x∗∗1,C −
1
4
)2. (12)
The only solution for which the qr1 - the reaction point at which the equilibrium policy
jumps discontinuously to x∗∗1,C - is greater than 1/4, so that the left-hand side of the
equation is valid, is
qr1 =
2 + δ +
√
8δ
4 + 4δ
. (13)
So for any qr1 ≤ q1 ≤ x∗∗1,C , we have GC,1(q1, 2) = x∗∗1,C . The intuition behind this
jump is that, due to the quadratic disutilitites, for high δ the game payoﬀ for Cis very
negatively aﬀected by unfavorable second-period outcomes. Moreover, the second-
period outcomes are kinked so that for very high x1, C can actually extract a better
policy in the second round than for slightly lower ones. Thus, there comes a point
where taking the hit to ﬁrst-period utility by deliberately proposing a policy more
26
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 10 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol10/iss1/4
removed from C’s ﬁrst-period preference is more than made up for by the more
favorable policy in the second period that very high status quo values allow C to get.
Note that x∗∗1,C ≤ x∗1,M . Therefore, there will again be a gridlock interval whose lower
bound is q1 = x
∗∗
1,C , because after that point the status quo is closer to x
∗
1,M than the
chairman’s optimal proposal and the value in M ’s acceptance set that maximizes C’s
utility is the lowest one - the status quo.
Once the status quo is higher than x∗1,M , however, we can see from (9) that there
are policy proposals in M ’s acceptance set correspondingly lower than x∗1,M which
are preferred by C and yields the same payoﬀ to M . Thus, in equilibrium C will
propose a policy that leaves M just indiﬀerent between the proposal and the higher
status quo. That is, C oﬀers
GC,1(q1 ≥ x∗1,M , 2) =
{
x1 s.t. ‖x1 − x∗1,M‖ = ‖q1 − x∗1,M‖
}
= 2x∗1,M − q1 (14)
and M accepts. However, C will only lower his proposal away from x∗1,M until it is
equal to x∗∗1,C - his preferred policy in the upper half of the policy range - and then
propose x∗∗1,C for all q1 > 2x
∗
1,M − x∗∗1,C .
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
5.2.1 First-period state is 1
As we saw in the previous proof, knowing the agenda-setter’s local utility maxima is
very useful in determining his equilibrium strategy. In Model 2, the second-period
payoﬀ functions change at q2 = 1/2, which means that there are two policy intervals
to consider that could have diﬀerent local utility maxima. In 1, for all x1 ∈ [0, 12 ] -
the lower half of the policy space - the chairman solves the optimization problem
max
x1
−[x2 + δ
2
(x2)] (15)
which has the unique solution that we will call x∗C = 0 for δ ∈ [0, 1]. On the other
hand, If he considers proposals in the upper half x1 ∈ [12 , 1], he solves
max
x1
−[x2 + δ
2
((x− 1)2) + (x− 1
2
)2)], (16)
which has no interior solution, but decreases in x1. Thus, choosing a proposal in
x1 ∈ [0, 12 ] always gives C a utility at least as high as any x1 ∈ [12 , 1]. Consequently,
the chairman would like x1 to be as close as possible to x
∗
C = 0 and, in equilibrium,
it needs to be true that x1 ≤ q1.
Similarly, we can ﬁnd player M ’s local utility-maximizing ﬁrst-period policies in
the lower and the upper half of the policy spectrum - let’s call them x∗M,L and x
∗
M,U .
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The preferred policy for x1 ∈ [0, 12) can be found by solving
max
x1
−[(x− 1
2
)2 +
δ
2
((x− δ
2
)2) + (
1
2
)2)] (17)
gives the boundary solution x∗M,L = 1/2 . Thus, the utility to M increases in x1. On
the other hand, for policy rates x1 ∈ [12 , 1], M solves
max
x1
−[(x− 1
2
)2 +
δ
2
((x− δ
2
)2) + (x− 1)2)]
which results in a preferred policy value of x∗M,U =
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
. It can be easily veriﬁed
that for 1/2 ≤ x1 ≤ x∗M,U , M ’s payoﬀ strictly increases in x1. Thus, for q1 < x∗M,U ,
M will only accept policy proposals greater than the status quo.
policy is symmetric around x1 =
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
and for x1 ∈
(
1
2
,
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
]
M ’s payoﬀ is
strictly greater than for any x1 ∈ [0, 12 ]. Thus, M accepts any proposal closer to
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
than the status quo.
Consequently, for this interval q1 ∈ [0, x∗M,U ], C’s preferred value in the acceptance
set is the status quo - gridlock occurs. As long as a policy from the upper half of the
spectrum is chosen, M ′s payoﬀ is symmetric around x∗M,U due to the quadratic loss
function. Thus, for the interval q1 ∈
[
x∗U,M , 2x
∗
M,U − 12
]
there is a policy x1 = 2x
∗
M,U −
q1 that makes M indiﬀerent between the status quo and is the lowest acceptable
proposal. As the chairman’s utility increases with lower policies, this indiﬀerence
point conditional on the status quo will be the equilibrium proposal. in this interval.
For q1 ≥ 2x∗M,U − 12 , however, we know that the lowest acceptable x1 is smaller than
1
2
. But at q2 = 1/2 the second-period payoﬀ function changes and with it the range
of policy values which make M better oﬀ than the status quo. We can describe the
lowest acceptable policy in this interval by a function that chooses the lowest possible
x1 such that M is indiﬀerent between the status quo and the policy oﬀered, given the
discount factor. More speciﬁcally, we want to ﬁnd v(q1, δ) such that
−
[
(−1
2
)2 +
δ
2
((z − 1
2
)2 + (
1
2
)2)
]
= −
[
(q1 − 1
2
)2 +
δ
2
((q1 − 1
2
)2 + (q1 − 1)2)
]
. (18)
Some algebra gives us v =
√
(4q1 − 2)(2q1δ2 + 6q1δ + 4q1 − 2δ2 − 5δ − 2)
2δ + 4
, which will
be the equilibrium proposal for q1 ≥ 2x∗M,U − 12 .
5.2.2 First-period state is 2
Using the by now familiar method of maximizing the interval-speciﬁc utility function
with regard to x1 we ﬁnd that if a policy from x1 ∈ [0, 12 ] is chosen, the chairman’s
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utility is maximized at x∗C,L =
1
2 + δ
. On the other hand, for x1 ∈ [12 , 1], C’s local
utility maximum occurs at x∗C,U =
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
. We can also easily compute that of these
two policies, x∗C,L is the global maximizer of the chairman’s utility for all x1 ∈ [0, 1].
Analogously, for the interval x1 ∈ [12 , 1], member M now solves
max
x1
−[(x− 1)2 + δ
2
((x− 1)2) + (x− 1
2
)2)) (19)
yielding the solution x∗M,U =
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
, which is the only utility maximum. To see this,
note that when policies from x1 ∈ [0, 12 ] are considered by M , he solves
max
x1
−[(x− 1)2 + δ
2
((
1
2
)2 + (x− 1
2
)2))] (20)
which only has the boundary solution x∗M,L =
1
2
, indicating that But we know that
x∗M,L cannot be a maximum of the policy continuum because for x1 ∈ [12 , 1] utility
increases for policy values closer to x∗M,U and thus some policy values adjacent to
x∗M,L have a higher utility. This also implies that for 0 ≤ q1 ≤ x∗M,U all proposals in
M ’s acceptance set are at least as great as the status quo.
From the latter fact, we can derive the equilibrium proposals by the chairman in
the same interval: C can get his global utility maximum x∗L,C =
1
2 + δ
accepted for
all q1 ∈ [0, x∗U,M ]. Moreover, for status quo values slightly greater than x∗M,U , the
status quo will be the policy with the highest utility to C in the acceptance set so
that gridlock occurs.
This gridlock interval of status quo values will be bounded at the lower end by
x∗M,U and at the upper end by the status quo value at which the utility for C from
gridlock is less than his payoﬀ from getting his preferred value in the upper half of
the policy continuum - x∗C,U - accepted. We can ﬁnd the status quo value at which
his policy proposal jumps between the two main intervals - let’s call it the reaction
point - by solving C’s indiﬀerence condition comparing the utility from proposing the
status quo in x1 ∈ [0, 12 ] to the utility from x∗C,U :(
x1 − 1
2
)2
+
δ
2
(x1)
2 =
(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
− 1
2
)2
+
δ
2
[(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
− 1
2
)2
+
(
1− 2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)2]
From this condition, we ﬁnd that
y =
(
1
2 + δ
)(
1 +
√
2δ3
4
√
δ + 1
)
(21)
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is the reaction point. Note that y ≤ 1
2
∀ δ ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, note that
x∗C,U =
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
<
4 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
= x∗M,U ∀ δ ∈ [0, 1] (22)
Thus, M will accept x∗C,U as long as it is greater than the status quo, which is true
for y ≤ q1 ≤ x∗C,U with y given in (21) above.
By the same reasoning, for x∗C,U ≤ q1 ≤ x∗M,U , gridlock occurs because the status
quo is the lowest and utility-maximizing policy in M ’s acceptance set.
However, when the status quo policy is above x∗M,U , as noted several times before,
the acceptance set also contains values lower than x∗M,U that are at most equidistant
with the status quo from it. The local symmetry of payoﬀs to Mwill suﬃce here to
determine the equilibrium proposal as no equilibrium policies in this interval will be
from the lower half of the policy space. The value in the acceptance set that maximizes
C’s utility is the lowest one, which is simply obtained by reﬂecting the status quo in
M ’s preferred policy x∗M,U . Thus, the equilibrium proposal for x
∗
M,U ≤ q1 ≤ 1 will be
GC,1(q1, 
2) = 2x∗M,U − q1 = 2
(
2 + 3δ
4 + 4δ
)
− q1 . (23)
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First, we should note that there are two diﬀerent possible states of the economy in
the ﬁrst period, as well as two diﬀerent factions in the committee, and two diﬀerent
halves of the policy space in which the policy choice x1 can fall. Thus, we can think
about every player having a preferred policy outcome in the ﬁrst period for every
economic state and half of the policy space. In order to simplify the strategic analysis
of the equilibrium decisions, I will ﬁrst compute these eight diﬀerent unconstrained
preferences for ﬁrst period policy and then derive the equilibrium proposal function
by C based on these.
5.3.1 Unconstrained Optimal Policy
If there were no bargaining taking place in the ﬁrst period and one of the two players
were simply allowed to pick his preferred policy rate X∗P , the two players C and M
would simply solve the following unconstrained maximization problem, taking into
account the uncertainty over the bargaining outcome in the second period:
GP,1(q1, 
s, λL2 ) = arg max
x∈[0,1]
UP (x1, 
s
1) +
δ
4
(
2∑
L=1
2∑
s=1
UP,2(x1, 
s, λL2 )
)
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where P ∈ {C,M}. Temporarily ignoring the institutional bargaining structure in the
ﬁrst period, the optimal unconstrained choices, obtained by solving that maximization
problem using the known second-period outcomes, are the ones in the table below.
Table 1: Players’ Local Utility Maxima for First-Period Policy
Players States
1 2
x1 <
1
2
x1 ≥ 12 x1 < 12 x1 ≥ 12
C δ
8+6δ
N/A 4+5δ
8+6δ
2+2δ
4+3δ
M 2+δ
4+3δ
4+5δ
8+6δ
N/A 8+5δ
8+6δ
The two ﬁelds left empty indicate that there is no minimum of the loss function
with these characteristics, making the solution in the other half of the policy space
the preferred choice by that player for the entire policy space.
5.3.2 First-period state is 1
To ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies, we can proceed as in the previous sections, by
considering all possible status quo values in turn and ﬁnding the policy rate most
favorable to the proposer that will also be accepted by the responding player over the
status quo.
We can easily see from the table above that C’s preferred policy x∗C is greater or
equal to zero and smaller than M ’s corresponding utility-maximizing choice in the
lower half of the policy space - which I will call x∗M,L. Thus, for q1 ∈ [0, x∗C ], it is true
that x∗C will be closer to x
∗
M,L than the status quo and therefore C will propose his
optimal choice for that status quo interval and it will be accepted.
For status quo values from x∗C upwards, however, gridlock occurs. More speciﬁcally,
for q1 ∈ [x∗C , x∗M,L], the given status quo is in between the preferred ﬁrst-period policies
of the two players and thus the only point in the acceptance set that C wants to
propose is the status quo itself.
Once the status quo is higher than x∗M,L, however, we know that locally
A1(q1, 
1) = x1 ∈ [0, 1] s.t. ‖x1 − x∗M,L‖ ≤ ‖q1 − x∗M,L‖.
and thus the lowest acceptable policy rate will be equidistant to x∗M,L with the status
quo but lower. This is the policy in the acceptance set closest to x∗C and is thus
proposed by C in equilibrium.
However, we need to remember from the table above that there are two local
maxima of M ’s utility over the entire policy range, of which x∗M,U - the maximum
in the upper half of the range - turns out to be the global maximum. Thus, as the
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status quo approaches x∗M,U its utility to M increases towards its global maximum.
Eventually, there comes a point when C cannot ﬁnd a lower-half policy that would
compensate M for agreeing to move the policy down from the status quo q1. At ﬁrst,
however C can oﬀer a policy choice more favorable to M than the one equidistant
to x∗M,L to keep M indiﬀerent between the latter and the status quo. The point at
which C needs to change its proposal function in this way is where
(q1 − 1
2
)2 + δ
(
1
2
(q1 − 1
2
2
+
1
16
+
1
4
q21
)
≥ (q1 − 1
2
)2 + δ
(
1
4
(q1 − 1
2
2
+
1
4
(q1 − 1)2
)
.
The left-hand side of this equation is the disutility to M of accepting a proposal
equidistant to x∗M,L with the status quo in the lower half of the policy spectrum (and
thus with the same disutility as the status quo with regard to x∗M,L), while the right-
hand side is the disutility of rejecting any proposal in favor of the status quo in the
upper half of the policy range. This is fulﬁlled for x1 ≥ 12 . Of course, this result is
not surprising, because we know that the point where the second-period strategies
change is x1 = q2 =
1
2
.
Consequently, for q1 ≥ 12 , the proposal function GC,1(q1, 11) steeply increases again
towards x∗M,L, in order to induce M not to reject the proposal in favor of the status
quo. More speciﬁcally, the proposal needs to be equal to the compensation function
z(q1, δ), which is deﬁned by
(z − 1
2
)2 + δ
(
1
2
(z − 1
2
)2 +
1
16
+
1
4
(z)2
)
≤ (q1 − 1
2
)2 + δ
(
1
4
(q1 − 1
2
2
+
1
4
(q1 − 1)2
)
(24)
as the proposal that will give M at least as high a utility as the status quo q1. In
equilibrium, this equation will hold with equality. From this, we can compute the
necessary proposal function z(q1, δ) that will make M indiﬀerent between accepting
and reverting to the status quo to be
z =
2 + δ
4 + 3δ
− 1
2
√
(1/9)(2δ + 4)2 − 4(δ + 4/3)(q1(4/3 + 5δ/3)− q21(δ + 4/3)− δ/2.
However, for status quo values higher than the value at which this proposal function
is equal to x∗M,L, there is no better proposal in the lower half of the policy spectrum
that C could make to induce M not to revert to the status quo in the upper half.
Thus, for z(q1, δ) ≥ x∗M,L the equilibrium proposal function discontinuously jumps
into the upper half of the policy spectrum and gridlock results. The reaction point
J1 at which this occurs can be computed from equating the two expressions for x
∗
M,L
and z(q1, δ) above to obtain
J1 =
15δ2 −√3(3δ2 + 4δ) + 32δ + 16
2(3δ + 4)2
.
A familiar pattern of strategic behavior will repeat itself in the upper half of the policy
space: the gridlock continues until x∗M,U because C does not prefer any proposals in
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the acceptance set - which only contains policy values larger than q1 - to the status
quo. However, for q1 ≥ x∗M,U , a policy equidistant to x∗M,U with the status quo, but
lower, can be extracted from M ’s willingness to move away from the status quo and
thus will be proposed in equilibrium. From above, we can easily see that the proposal
function will thus be
GC,1(q1, 
1
1) = 2
(
4 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
)
− q1 (25)
for this interval of status quo policies. The inverse eﬀect from the one we saw above
is going to take place: As the status quo becomes more and more distant from x∗M,U
on the upside, there will come a point where C can even oﬀer a policy in the lower
half of the continuum and get it accepted. The ﬁrst policy value in the lower half
that M will accept over increasingly higher status quo values will of course be x∗M,L.
In analogy to the analysis above, the jump when C starts proposing x∗M,L, instead of
the proposal given by (25), occurs where
2
(
4 + 5δ
8 + 6δ
)
− q1 = J1,
at which pointM is indiﬀerent between x∗M,L and the status quo. Thus, in equilibrium,
for all q1 ≥ 2(4+5δ8+6δ )−J1, the accepted equilibrium proposal will be the policy function
for which M is indiﬀerent between the disutility of a proposal in the lower half of the
range and leaving the rate at the status quo in the upper half of the policy range. This
condition is the same as the one for z(q1, δ) computed above and thus the equilibrium
proposal will be z(q1, δ) for 2(
4+5δ
8+6δ
)− J1 ≤ q1 ≤ 1.
5.3.3 First-period state is 2
Considering the table of unconstrained ﬁrst-period optima, we can immediately see
that for very low status quo values in state 21, the proposer (C in this case) can
get his lower-range optimum x∗C,L accepted, because M always prefers higher policy
values to lower values in the lower half of the policy spectrum. Thus, for q1 ≤ x∗C,L,
the equilibrium proposal will be GC,1(q1, 
2
1) = x
∗
C,L.
From q1 ≥ x∗C,L upwards, however, gridlock occurs, because M prefers the status
quo to lower values and C prefers the status quo to any policy value above it.
This gridlock interval lasts until the utility of continuing to propose the status
quo in the lower half of the policy range becomes lower than the utility at C’s local
optimum in the upper half, x∗C,U =
2 + 2δ
4 + 3δ
. That is, a discrete upward jump in
equilibrium policy to x∗C,U will occur where
(x∗C,U−
1
2
)2+δ
(
1
4
(x∗C,U − 1)2 +
1
16
+
1
2
(x∗C,U −
1
2
)2
)
= (x−1
2
)2+δ
(
1
2
(q1)
2 +
1
4
(x− 1
2
)2
)
.
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In this equation, the left side represents the disutility from x∗C,U and the right side is
the disutility of staying with a lower-half status quo. This equality is holds at
J2 =
3δ2 +
√
3(3δ2 + 4δ) + 16δ + 16
2(3δ + 4)2
for δ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, q1 = J2 is the reaction point at which the equilibrium policy
proposal jumps up to x∗C,U .
For status quo values of J2 ≤ q1 ≤ x∗C,U , C will be able to get his upper-half
optimum accepted, because it is lower than M ’s optimum policy (see Table 1) but
higher than the status quo and thus preferred by M to it.
From x∗C,U ≤ q1 ≤ x∗M,U , we ﬁnd ourselves in a gridlock interval again, because the
status quo is closer to M ’s optimum than any lower policy values but C prefers the
status quo to any higher policy values.
However for all q1 ≥ x∗M,U , the tradeoﬀ of the disutility to M of a status quo above
his optimal value against a lower policy proposal becomes possible. As payoﬀs are
symmetric around the optimal value, a lower proposal with the same utility to M as
the status quo has to be equidistant to x∗M,U . Thus, the lowest proposal that C can
get accepted in equilibrium is
GC,1(q1, 
2
1) = 2x
∗
C,L − q1
for all x∗M,U ≤ q1 ≤ 1.
6 Welfare Implications and Eﬃciency
In this section, I will expand upon the results above, by analyzing the eﬀects of
the introduced variations from a welfare perspective and thereby developing stylized
implications of my model.
6.1 Strategic Gridlock
Given that the policy space is a continuum, the probability of the given status quo
policy being exactly equal to the utility-maximizing policy in any period is eﬀectively
zero. Thus, from an overall welfare perspective, every period in which the policy rate
remains unchanged is a foregone opportunity to move the policy rate closer to the
optimum. That is, in some sense gridlock periods are an indication of institutional
failure. Consequently, we can look at changes in the likelihood of gridlock to draw
qualitative conclusions about how the change in the economic environment between
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models 1 and 2, or the institutional variation between models 2 and 3 aﬀect policy-
making.
In table 2 below, I summarize the total width of all status quo intervals that lead
to gridlock in equilibrium in the ﬁrst period of the three propositions respectively.
Table 2: General Gridlock Intervals
Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Prop. 3
1 2+3δ
4+4δ
2+3δ
4+4δ
J2
2 2−2δ+
√
8δ
4+4δ
√
2δ3
(8+4δ)
√
1+δ
+ 1
2+2δ
J2
where
J2 =
3δ2 +
√
3(3δ2 + 4δ) + 16δ + 16
2(3δ + 4)2
.
In order to be able to interpret these interval widths directly as probabilities and
compare them, we have to assume that the ﬁrst period status quo policy is drawn
from a uniform distribution over the policy space [0,1] 5. Otherwise, the possibility
of gridlock occurring for a status quo interval would need to be weighted by the
likelihood of that status quo occurring. However, besides the diﬃculty of deriving
such a status quo density function from real data and adapting it to my stylized
model, the uniform distribution assumption has several points in its favor: the size
and direction of a future change in monetary policy required does not seem to be
biased in one direction - as the time series of interest rates in Figure 1 showed, no
strong long-run drift or clustering of policy rates around speciﬁc values seems to occur
in practice.
More speciﬁcally, gridlock can occur for almost every possible status quo value
in one of the economic states in my models. Moreover, the approximate location
of the gridlock intervals in the policy space is similar for the three models. Thus,
the diﬀerent weighting of certain status quo values would not necessarily change
the qualitative conclusions presented here. Consequently, I consider it justiﬁable to
assume for simplicity here that status quo states are drawn uniformly.
Under this assumption, we can compute the numerical value of the interval widths
above for speciﬁc discount factors explicitly and interpret the results as the probability
of gridlock occurring in the ﬁrst period of that model, given the state of the economy.
These probabilities are shown for δ = 1
2
and δ = 1 in the tables below. In order
to compare the overall ex-ante probability of gridlock in the diﬀerent models, I also
show the sum of the gridlock likelihood in the two states of the economy, weighted
by their probability of occurring.
5Here I am especially indebted to Wolfgang Pesendorfer for alerting me to the necessity of making
this assumption explicit.
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Table 3: Gridlock probability for δ = 1
δ = 1 Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Prop. 3
1 .625 .625 .481
2 .354 .333 .481
Weighted Total .490 .479 .481
Table 4: Gridlock probability for δ = 1
2
δ = 1 Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Prop. 3
1 .583 .583 .488
2 .500 .374 .488
Weighted Total .542 .479 .488
We can see from these numbers that gridlock is least likely to occur in Model 2. In
comparison both, the decrease in uncertainty over second-period preferences in Model
1 and the increase in uncertainty over the agenda-setting authority in Model 3, lead
to a higher chance of gridlock. Although these implications might at ﬁrst sound
surprising, the intuition behind them is simple: Firstly, as had been noted in section
4.6, the reason behind some of the kinks in the proposal functions is that for policy
values at the margin of the policy space, the risk averse players’ incentives are aligned
in trying to bring the ﬁrst-period policy rate to ”safer” values closer to the center of
the policy space. When the spread of possible second-period preferences is increased
from Model 1to Model 2, the risk averse utility functions mean that the aversion
to these marginal policies in the second period increases more than proportionally.
Consequently, the agenda-setter can extract relatively large concessions in his favor
in the second period. But given that he knows this, the agenda-setter will also be
more willing to move the policy towards its pareto-eﬃcient value in the ﬁrst period.
In short, more extreme preferences in the second period lead to more favorable
second-period outcomes for the agenda setter. Therefore, he has to hedge less against
adverse second-period outcomes, which, in turn, makes ﬁrst-period policy more eﬃ-
cient. In the plots of the equilibrium proposals we can partly see this eﬀect in the
fact that there are more and larger jumps in Model 2 than in Model 1: the jumps
occur between diﬀerent local utility-maxima for C, and their height and number is in
some sense a function of the fact that in the second period of Model 2, C can get his
preferred policy in state 1 with the lowest status quo q2 as well as with the highest
status quo.
The increase in gridlock between Model 2 and 3 has a very similar intuition: the
institutional change towards an equal chance of holding agenda-setting power in the
second period for both players means that whosoever holds the agenda-setting power
in the ﬁrst period will need to hedge much more against unfavorable outcomes in the
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second period than the ﬁxed agenda-setter in Model 2. This hedging by the agenda-
setter occurs by gaining greater utility in the ﬁrst period when proposal power is
certain and proposing policies that are more biased towards ”his” side of the policy
space. This makes ﬁrst-period policy less eﬃcient and more ”partisan” in a broad
sense: the jumps in the equilibrium function are much smaller in state 2 in Model 3
than for Model 2 because the local maxima are less spread out due to less certainty
whether concessions in the ﬁrst period could be recovered in the second period when
the other player might hold the proposal power.
6.2 Pareto Eﬃciency
In this section, I will explore how a diﬀerent measure of eﬃciency in policymaking
is aﬀected by the variations in economic environment and institutional setup in my
model. Whereas in the previous section, we looked at the likelihood of failing to
change the policy, here we will see whether occurred policy changes, if any, are large
enough. The criterion of comparison will be the probability of a pareto-eﬃcient
outcome. That is, a ﬁrst period outcome is pareto-eﬃcient if neither player could
gain a higher utility in that period without the other player being made worse oﬀ.
In my models, this is the same as saying that a pareto-eﬃcient policy lies in between
the naive policy preferences rM(
s
t) and rC(
s
t) of the two players.
For status quo intervals whose equilibrium bargaining outcome does not fulﬁll this
condition, the institutional setup is clearly ineﬃcient: it could be improved upon in
any speciﬁc period by replacing the bargaining process with complete policy control
by only one of the two players. The latter change would lead to the player who
fully controls the policy rate choosing his preferred value in every period, which is
pareto-eﬃcient by deﬁnition. Similarly, a pareto-eﬃciency could be ensured in every
period, if the status quo were exogenously given so that periods would not be linked
anymore6. In that case, no hedging occurs and an equilibrium consensus decision will
always fall in the interval between the players’ preferences.
Table 5: Status quo intervals with pareto-ineﬃcient outcomes
Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Prop. 3
1 [1
2
, 1+2δ
2+2δ
] [1
2
, 1+2δ
2+2δ
] [J1,
4+5δ
4+3δ
− J1]
2 [0, 1
2
[0, ( 1
2+δ
)(1 +
√
2δ3
4
√
δ+1
)] [0, J2]
Table 5 summarizes the probability of the status quo leading to such an ineﬃciency
6This is actually a practicable alternative to a system of leaving the previous interest rate as
the default option: a credible central bank can change market interest rates almost instantaneously
with the announcement of its rate target, without even having to engage in open-market operations.
Thus, the previous period’s interest rate is in some sense no more ”in place” than any other, making
”falling back” to it in case of disagreement unnecessary.
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for the three diﬀerent models. These probabilities are computed as the share of the
total policy interval which is constituted by status quo intervals leading to pareto-
ineﬃcient outcomes. These shares are equivalent to the probability of a pareto-
ineﬃcient outcome occuring in that state, as long as the status quo distribution in
the ﬁrst period is uniform, with the same caveats as in the previous section. Weighting
these probabilities of pareto-ineﬃciency by the likelihood of the two possible economic
states s, we can also obtain the ex-ante likelihood of a pareto-ineﬀcient ﬁrst-period
outcome for the whole two-period policy game. In Tables 5 and 6, I report the
computed values of these probabilities for δ ∈ {1
2
, 1}.
Table 6: Pareto-ineﬃcient outcome probability for δ = 1
δ = 1 Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Prop. 3
1 .25 .25 .2474
2 .5 .4167 .4809
Weighted Total .3750 .3333 .3641
Table 7: Pareto-ineﬃcient outcome probability for δ = 1
2
δ = 1 Prop. 1 Prop. 2 Prop. 3
1 .1667 .1667 .1575
2 .5 .4408 .4878
Weighted Total .3333 .3037 .3227
Comparing the likelihood of pareto-ineﬃciency between the three diﬀerent models,
we ﬁnd that the pattern mirrors that found for gridlock in the previous section.
The change in probability is negative for the increased uncertainty in the economic
environment. That is, greater uncertainty over the second-period state of the economy
leads to more pareto-eﬃcient policy outcomes in the ﬁrst period. On the other hand,
the agenda-setting uncertainty in model 3 makes the policy outcomes less pareto-
eﬃcient than Model 2 with a ﬁxed agenda-setter.
The intuition behind this is the same as in the previous section: environmental
uncertainty actually improves second-period outcomes for the ﬁrst-period agenda-
setter. The same is true when the agenda-setter gains certainty over his proposal
power in the second period. Consequently, there is less of a need for hedging against
adverse second-period outcomes, which makes ﬁrst-period policy more likely to be
pareto-eﬃcient.
Thus, the pareto-ineﬃciency probabilities exactly conﬁrm the qualitative eﬀects
found when considering the likelihood of gridlock in the previous section. In the next
section, I will see whether these results have some empirical validity.
38
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 10 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol10/iss1/4
7 Empirical Application of Results
From the preceding analysis of my theoretical results, we can derive some simple
implications to test empirically:
1. Monetary policy made by a committee can diverge considerably from the opti-
mal rate by underreacting to economic events: ”interest rate smoothing” occurs.
2. Consensus-based MPCs that have a ﬁxed agenda setter will outperform those
that do not at making pareto-eﬃcient policy decisions
3. Consensus-based MPCs without a ﬁxed agenda setter are less likely to change
the policy rate so that more gridlock occurs.
4. The ineﬃciency of monetary policy made by consensus-based committees is
reduced as economic uncertainty increases.
This analysis will be partly based on the categorization employed in Blinder (2007),
based on which the FOMC - an ”autocratically-collegial” committee - probably comes
closest to the setup of my model in Proposition 2 in that there is a clearly designated
and powerful agenda setter and rare dissent. On the other hand, the ECB’s Governing
Council - a ”genuinely-collegial” committee - has a strong emphasis on unanimity,
but its President, like the proposer in Proposition 3, has considerably less inﬂuence on
decision-making than the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the FOMC. The
Bank of England’s MPC, however, neither has a strong chairman nor an emphasis on
consensus, reaching its decisions by an open vote in an ”individualistic” manner and
is therefore only included here to put the other two time series in perspective.
7.1 Interest Rate Smoothing
As a general empirical phenomenon, the inertial behavior of central bank policy rates,
similar to the one found in this paper, has been noted and analyzed in several theo-
retical (for references see Gerlach-Kristen (2004)) and empirical studies: for instance,
there is considerable empirical evidence in Clarida et al. (2000) and Coibion & Gorod-
nichenko (2011) that the Federal Reserve only partially adjusts interest rates to eco-
nomic shocks and that there is substantial autocorrelation between interest rates from
one period to the next. For a full empirical exploration of interest rate smoothing I
refer the reader to these studies and the references contained therein.
Here, I would simply like to note that my models add a possible institutional
explanation to the existing explanations of policy inertia: the strategic behavior of
players in a dynamic bargaining setting can lead to substantial policy ineﬃciencies
and might thus be part of the solution to the puzzle.
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7.2 Monetary Policy Performance
When we are considering the empirical evidence for whether or not monetary policy
is eﬃcient, there are two diﬀerent ways of looking at the evidence: On the one hand,
we can look at outcome-based measures of monetary policy performance, as I will do
in this section. On the other hand, we can consider direct measures of policymaking
activity, which will be analyzed in the next section.
Figure 8: Inﬂation Performance of the ECB (Euro Area), the Fed (US) and the Bank
of England (UK); Data Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Of course, eﬃciency in monetary policy is hard to deﬁne, as data on the exact
preferences of committee factions and the true state of the economy are hard to
obtain. However, we can look at a measure that should be related to policy rates
being set according to the actual mandate of the institution: the ex post success of the
central banks at attaining and stabilizing the target value of certain macroeconomic
variables. Success at stabilizing the economy is assumed to be a rough indicator of
how closely an MPCs decisions track the optimally neutralizing policy response to
economic shocks. Note, however, that due to the multitude of unobserved confounding
variables any observations I will make here in this regard will be merely suggestive.
With this note of caution in mind, I will compare the performance of the ECB and
the Federal Reserve with regard to the rate of inﬂation and the growth rates of real
gross domestic product (RGDP) over the last decade.
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Figure 9: RGDP Growth Performance Performance of the ECB (Euro Area) and the
Fed (US); Data Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
Most central banks have an explicit or implicit inﬂation target - with the ECB
and the Fed being no exceptions. The ECB’s Governing Council has deﬁned its
mandate of price stability to mean below, but close to, 2% inﬂation. It should be
noted though that low inﬂation is rarely an end in itself for a central bank - even for
the ECB (Duisenberg, 1997) it is usually the means by which economic stability and
growth are supposed to be achieved. The Fed, in fact, has an explicit dual mandate
to promote maximum employment and stable prices7. As maximum employment is
hard to deﬁne exactly, I will use RGDP here instead, assuming that a high and stable
growth in output is a good proxy for high employment.
The time series of inﬂation and RGDP for the Euro Area, the United States and
the United Kingdom are graphed in Figures 8 and 9 respectively. We can see from
the graphs that the ECB achieved the most stable inﬂation out of the three central
banks, keeping it almost constant at about 2%, while US inﬂation was more variable
at a higher level. However, given that the Fed is explicitly, and the ECB perhaps
implicitly, mandated to also guarantee favorable conditions for economic growth, we
need to take into account the tradeoﬀ between inﬂation stabilization and RGDP
7According to the Federal Reserve Act, Section 2a: ”Monetary Policy Objectives”, available at
(URL): http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section2a.htm
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growth. Figure 9 suggests that inﬂation stability might come at an economic cost for
the ECB: its RGDP growth was lower than that for the US or the UK in most years.
Even for the years 2006-2008, when Euro Area growth exceeded American rates, the
comparison is biased in the ECB’s favor because the global ﬁnancial crisis started
earlier in the US than in other countries.
Table 8: Sample mean (μ) and variance (σ) of economic variables
Sample Period: Jan. 1999 to Dec.2010
Inﬂation RGDP Growth
σ σ μ
Fed 0.48 4.04 2.15
ECB 1.20 4.14 1.52
BoE 0.70 5.48 1.81
In Table 8, I make these comparisons more explicit by computing the variance of
inﬂation and RGDP growth as well as the mean of growth over the sample period8.
These numbers lend some support to the notion that the Fed was more successful
at ensuring both high and stable growth than the ECB, while the latter had more
success at stabilizing inﬂation. Thus, there might be weak evidence in favor of my
model’s prediction that economic performance overall was better for the ﬁxed-agenda
setter Fed than for the ECB over the last decade. However, as noted before, this
result is necessarily somewhat speculative and should be considered jointly with the
empirical evidence in the following sections.
7.3 Gridlock
As noted above, one way of looking at the eﬃciency of MPCs is looking at the data
on the actual policymaking process. As the event of changing the policy rate can be
measured directly, the empirical data on gridlock provide an immediate test for my
model’s implications.
On the one hand, there is anecdotal evidence supporting my conclusions: for in-
stance, with regard to the ECB, The Economist (2005) argues that, during the last
decade, ”it has changed interest rates less often than the Fed has, giving the impres-
sion of paralysis”. In other words, it is alleged to exhibit considerably more gridlock
8The mean of inﬂation is left out here, because for very low values of inﬂation what matters
is whether or not it can be anticipated, not the exact level, as Duisenberg (1997) notes. From a
seminar with Alan Blinder at Princeton University, I also learned that due to sticky prices it is not
exactly clear whether the gradient of economic costs as a function of inﬂation is negative or positive
as the annual inﬂation rate approaches zero - which is another reason not to compare the levels of
inﬂation.
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than the FOMC. This is is exactly what my results predict, as my variable agenda-
setter Model 3 - resembling the ECB’s leadership - shows more gridlock than the
ﬁxed proposer in the same economically uncertain environment in Model 2, which
more closely resembles the FOMC.
On the other hand, we can investigate this claim more rigorously by looking at
empirical data on MPC decisions for the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve and
the ECB during the last decade. The time series of these banks’ respective main
policy rates are for convenience displayed again in Figure 10 9.
Figure 10: Main policy rates at the Bank of England, European Central Bank and
Federal Reserve; Data Source: Central bank websites
We can see quite clearly from the graph that the ECB’s policy rate shows much more
inertia than the Fed’s, and is even somewhat more inert than the Bank of England’s,
with lower peaks and higher troughs than the rates of the latter two central banks.
Moreover, assuming that these three large developed economies are exposed to similar
economic shocks, the ECB’s Governing Council can be seen to lag behind the other
two banks’ MPCs in its responses, consistently starting to raise or lower rates after
them.
In Table 9, this observation is made more explicit by the probability π of an MPC
9These are: the Federal Funds Rate for the Fed, the Bank of England’s oﬃcial Bank Rate and
the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations rate
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meeting by that central bank leading to a change in the policy rate 10 during the
period from January 1999 to December 201011. Because the FOMC only meets eight
times per year, while the other two MPCs meet twelve times per year, in brackets I
also report the FOMC’s adjusted probability if it had been meeting four more times
every year without a rate change. Moreover, the table shows the average size of the
moves in the policy rate.
Table 9: Policy rate changes
Sample Period
January 1999 to December 2010
π Δ
Fed 47.9(31.9) 35.9
ECB 21.5 35.5
BoE 25.0 34.7
This clearly conﬁrms my model’s predictions: the Federal Reserve, with its chair-
man as a ﬁxed and strong policy proposer, is much less likely to leave the policy rate
unchanged in a meeting than the ECB with its less certain agenda-setter. Moreover,
it is not the case that the ECB makes up for this ineﬃciency in timing by moving
the rate more aggressively when it does - the almost identical average sizes of rate
changes indicate that there is no such compensation eﬀect.
7.4 Monetary Policy under Uncertainty
In this section, I will try to see whether there is some evidence that my model’s
implications with regard to monetary policy eﬃciency under uncertainty have empir-
ical relevance. If they do, we would expect the policymaking to be more eﬃcient as
uncertainty over the economic environment increases. Here, eﬃciency is deﬁned the
same way as in the previous section as a greater likelihood of changing the policy rate
and greater rate movements when they occur.
In order to test whether uncertainty is correlated with the chance of gridlock or the
absolute size of the rate changes, I will regress those two variables - which can be easily
obtained from the central bank websites - on the VIX12 - the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Market Volatility Index - which is a measure of market expectations of
stock market volatility over the next 30 days and is thus a reasonable measure of
uncertainty over short-term economic developments. The sample period is February
10This way of illustrating diﬀerentials in central bank decision-making was inspired by Gerlach-
Kristen (2004)
11The starting date has been chosen to coincide with the beginning of monetary policy-making by
the ECB in 1999
12The VIX data were downloaded directly from http://www.cboe.com
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1999 to May 2009, because the latter is the date when all three central banks hit
their respective lower bound of the policy rate - the value below which they would
not set it - and after which they engaged in unconventional monetary policy instead
of changing the policy rate. Thus the value of the latter would not be an accurate
indicator of changes in monetary policy after that date. However, the conclusions are
not substantially altered by including the most recent data as well.
Table 10: Regression of policy change dummy on volatility index
Sample Period: Feb. 1999 to May 2009
Probability of policy change at...
BoE ECB Fed
VIX(lagged) .0146*** .0130*** -.000879
(.00398) (.00419) .(00474)
Constant -.0283 -.0345 .366***
(.0932) (.0976) (.113)
n 124 124 124
In Table 10, I report the OLS estimates obtained from regressing a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the central bank changed its main policy rate in that month
13 on the VIX volatility expectation at the end of the previous month. The estimates
show that both for the Bank of England and the ECB, we ﬁnd that greater expected
volatility for a given month is correlated with a signiﬁcantly higher likelihood of a
rate change. For the Fed however, the estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The estimates in Table 11 lend further support to the hypothesis implied by my
theoretical analysis that uncertainty in fact improves the eﬃciency of policymaking
in a strategic bargaining setting: When we regress the absolute size in % of the rate
changes that were made on the expected stock volatility for the month when they
occurred, we ﬁnd that the policy rate is moved in signiﬁcantly larger increments during
months of higher uncertainty. This also means that the greater likelihood of reaching
agreement on a new policy, documented in Table 10, is not simply a consequence of
few large adjustments being replaced by many small adjustments. To the contrary,
policy changes are not only more likely but also larger in volatile months.
Arguably, these empirical applications jointly lend some support to my hypothesis
that several aspects of real central bank behavior can be explained by a strategic
bargaining approach to the policymaking process.
13I am not correcting for the fact that not every month had an MPC meeting because unless MPC
meetings are more likely to occur in volatile months - which is not the case as they operate on a
schedule set far in advance - the only eﬀect of that adjustment would be to reduce the standard
errors, which would not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the qualitative conclusions drawn here
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Table 11: Regression of size of rate change on volatility index
Sample Period: Feb. 1999 to May 2009
Size of policy change at...
BoE ECB Fed
VIX(lagged) .0171*** .00675*** .0163***
(.00447) (.00172) .(00298)
Constant -.0953 .179*** .0297
(.101) (.0403) (.0549)
n 36 31 43
8 Concluding Remarks
On the one hand, I have shown in this study that a simple two-person bargaining
model with an endogenous status quo and strategic players can replicate the observed
inertia in monetary policy-making by committee. On the other hand, variations in
the economic environment and the agenda-setting power in such a model can lead
to stylized and non-obvious implications that seem to be supported by empirical
observations: Uncertainty over the future policymaking environment can actually lead
to more eﬀective policymaking in the present, and committees with a ﬁxed agenda-
setter may outperform those with a variable agenda-setter in achieving a change in
policy and setting pareto-eﬃcient policy rates.
These results show that it is important to consider committee members as strategic
actors when designing monetary policy committees because diﬀerences in preferences
between them can otherwise undermine the eﬀectiveness of the institution. Further-
more, diﬀerent committees can diﬀer substantially in their success depending on the
environment in which they operate and their internal structures - a point that is often
lost in debates over the historical success of policy institutions.
Further research should expand upon the rudimentary statistical analysis employed
here to test my speciﬁc claims or those of competing institutional explanations of
committee behavior in order to further reﬁne our understanding of the actual decision-
making processes that shape economic policy.
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